The P=?NP problem is philosophically solved by showing P is equal to NP in the random access with unit multiply (MRAM) model. It is shown that the MRAM model empirically best models computation hardness. The P=?NP problem is shown to be a scientific rather than a mathematical problem. The assumptions involved in the current definition of the P?=NP problem as a problem involving non deterministic Turing Machines (NDTMs) from axiomatic automata theory are criticized. The problem is also shown to be neither a problem in pure nor applied mathematics. The details of the MRAM model and the well known Hartmanis and Simon construction that shows howt oc ode and simulate NDTMs on MRAM machines is described. Since the computation power of MRAMs is the same as NDTMs, P is equal to NP.T he paper shows that the justification for the NDTM P?=NP problem using a letter from Kurt Godel to John Von Neumann is incorrect by showing Von Neumann explicitly rejected automata models of computation hardness and used his computer architecture for modeling computation that is exactly the MRAM model. The paper argues that Deolalikar'ss cientific solution showing P not equal to NP if assumptions from statistical physics are used, needs to be revisited.
Introduction
In the early 1970s the informal problem of howt oc haracterize the difficulty of solving problems on digital computers was defined as the "P=?NP" problem. An easy problem could be solved on a deterministic Turing Machine (TM) (Turing[1936] ) in a polynomial bounded number of steps. These problems are in the class P.Ahard problem requires a non deterministic Turing Machine (NDTM). AN DTM works in parallel trying all computations at once. Ap roblem is then in the class NP if the answer can be checked in polynomial time. The checking is called a decision problem. The P=?NP question asks if problems that seem to require an NDTM can actually be solved in polynomial time on a normal TM.
The P=?NP question was developed by S. Cook (Cook[971] , ) who showed that problems in NP could be reduced to the satisfiability problem by a TM in polynomial bounded number of steps. The satisfiability problem takes a set of variables and a collection of clauses and asks if there is a truth assignment that satisfies every clause. The polynomial bound is in the number of variables. The decision problem is easy.G iv ena na ssignment for every clause, just check each one. Finding the assignments may be hard requiring exhaustive search. The P=?NP problem gained wide acceptance when R. Karp showed that a number of interesting combinatorial problems could be reduced to satisfiability in polynomial time on a TM (Karp[1971] ).
The P=?NP problem has led to progress in axiomatic set theory predicate calculus based complexity by combining manya pplications of computers into one abstract problem. However, in the process it removedp roblem specific details and replaced scientific problem solving with axiomatized mathematics. It also does not provide assistance in algorithm design. This paper criticizes the Turing machine model and the methods of formal logic based complexity theory.
It solves the scientific P?=NP problem by showing that P is equal to NP on realistic models of modern computers. It argues the best model of modern computers is the random access memory machine (MRAM) with unit cost multiplication for which NDTMs can be encoded and simulated by the MRAM machine, i.e. realistic models of computation already have the computing power of NDTMs. The paper also defends Deolaliker'ss cientific solution to the P=?NP problem where he shows P not equal to NP using properties of the statistical physics of Boltzmann gases. Deolaliker'ss olution and its assumptions and physical observations can be viewed either as a problem in mathematical physics. This paper should be read in the context of the Popperian school that believesf ollowing Niels Bohr that theories are first conceptual then mathematics can be added, but if the mathematics and the conceptual theory differ,the conceptualization has priority.A lso, that theory proliferation is positive because it allows theories to be tested by research programme competition (Lakatos[1999] ).
P=?NP Research Program Questionable
P=?NP is not a problem in pure mathematics because the central question is howt o characterize and measure computation hardness. Questions of measurement accuracyo r suitability are physical problems. The P=?NP research program needs to showt hat TM based polynomial time is the correct scientific model of computational efficiency. One problem with using automata theory predicate logic is that the philosophyofmathematics in which existence is defined as "can be generated from axioms" is required.
If one uses platonic philosophyofmathematics instead, TM programs do not exist because the halting problem is a Bertrand Russell style paradox. Computable can still mean recursively enumerable because recursive functions exist. If TM programs that do not halt do not exist, then different models of computability are not equivalent and the Church-Turing Thesis becomes meaningless. I am using the argument style of 20th century Swiss mathematician Paul Finsler here and Finsler[1996] ). It is incorrect to base the empirical question "What makes a computation hard" on one particular philosophyofmathematics. P=?NP is not a problem in applied mathematics because it does not use mathematics to solveas cientific problem but is itself a theory of calculation. In a sense the P=?NP problem defines computation complexity in order to support the Church-Turing Thesis and the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI). Finsler'sPlatonism was seen by J. Webb as enough of a problem to criticize it in his book that attempted to showt hat thought is mechanistic and nothing more than the Church-Turing calculation (Webb[1980] , p. 257). Also J. Lucas reviewo f Webb[1980] in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. (Lucas[1982] ).
Peter Naur'sc riticism of TMs and argument that all non computational thought is being suppressed can be viewed as criticizing the P=?NP research program. See Naur's2 005 Turing Aw ard lecture (Naur[2007] ).
P Equals NP for RAM Machines with Multiply
In the early 1970s there were other models still using the TM predicate calculus automata theory paradigm. The empirically best characterization of computation difficulty is random access machines with unbounded memory cell size and multiplication that only requires one unit of time (called the MRAM model) because it corresponds to operations in physical computers.
The MRAM models were studied by Hartmanis and Simon (Hartmanis[1974] and Hartmanis[1974a] ).
The MRAM model is close to modern computer architecture with large random access memories and fast multiplication due to the lowl ev elp arallelism of multi-issue CPUs with branch prediction. The MRAM model allows unbounded memory cell size and access to bits within memory cells. This allows NDTM configurations to be encoded in memory cells so that MRAMs can simulate NTDMs in Polynomial time (Hartmanis[1974] , 38-45).
In the MRAM model P is equal to NP or alternatively the P=?NP problem does not exist in the MRAM model. One might object that MRAM memory cells are unrealistic because they allows toring structures that can be exponential in problem size (the infinity here is finite but unbounded). This type of automata based complexity is abstract. TMs also allowa ni nfinite number of tape squares. Also the Godel style encoding and simulation changes algorithm design from the meta levelN DTM world to the world of computer models and application problem "programming".
There are twom ain reasons the MRAM model is scientifically better than the P=?NP NDTM model. The P=?NP model does not allowhuman ingenuity in problem specific algorithm design. A trivial example is that sorting can run in linear time by converting a value to a number and storing value k in cell k. This is related to hashing that in the MRAM model does not have the worst case behavior it has in the P=?NP TM model. In the P=?NP automata theory paradigm, ingenuity is used in the transformation and simulation proofs but not in the TM application programs.
Another advantage of the MRAM model is that it corresponds to the von Neumann architecture by allowing lowl ev elp arallelism without the scheduling and synchronization problems that occur when a large number of simple computers somehows olveap roblem in parallel. One can think of the MRAM model as modeling modern CPUs with an unbounded number of instruction issue and coordinate units (sometimes called pipe lines).
See Meyer[2016] for a description of howt ou tilize modern CPU lowl ev elp arallelism to implement a Verilog Hardware Description language compiler that is always 30 times faster and sometimes 100 times faster than a compiled simulator that does not utilize the parallelism.
Von Neumann Rejected Automata Based Measures of Program Hardness
Juri Hartmanis also believedt here is a need to justify NDTM based complexity theory in "Godel, von Neumann and the P=?NP Problem" from his April 1989 The Structural Complexity Column (Hartmanis[1989] ). Hartmanis writes:
There is strong circumstantial evidence that the idea [for] the internally stored program concept, proposed in this report [Logic Design of a Electronic Computing Instrument (Aspray[1990] , pp. 37-46)] and often attributed to von Neumann was derivedfrom Turing universal machines. Vo nNeumann has neverclarified the origin of these concepts.
Hartmanis' justification is based on a letter from Kurt Godel to John von Neumann in which Godel discusses the problem: "howm anyT uring machine steps are required to decide if there is a proof of length n for a formula F in predicate calculus". Godel wonders if exhaustive search is required or if only Log N or (log N)**2 steps are needed (p. 6). This section shows that vonN eumann explicitly abandoned automata based complexity and was dubious about Godel continuing to hold on to Hilbert'sf alsified axiomization of everything programme. In fairness, neither Aspray'sh istorical study John von Neumann 
Von Neumann as a Philosopher and Mathematical Physicist
Ib elieve there was no interest in using automata theory to study axiomatic logic in the 1950s because the Hilbert programme was viewed as falsified. There wasi nterest especially by vonN eumann in the scientific problem of modeling the human nervous system using automata. My argument is based on recent publication of von Neumann'sl etters and studies analyzing von Neumann'sp hilosophy. Von Neumann sawh imself as a philosopher (Neumann[2005] , p.16, letter to Fornegura, Dec. 1947). His formalization of quantum mechanics in the late 1920s and early 1930s was undertaken as part of the Hilbert Programme to formalize physics. By the late 1930s von Neumann had givenu po nt he Hilbert Programme and accepted natural philosophy based empiricism of the founders of modern physics. In 1939 von Neumann writes to R. Ortvay (pp. 263-264, also discussed p. 8).
Godel'sr esults mean that there is no "complete" axiomatic system, not eveni nm athematics, and I believe that there is actually no other consistent interpretation of this complexofquestions.
Vo nN eumann'sa cceptance of the anti-formalist methods of physics is perhaps best illustrated by a story he would tell in the early 1950s relating Wolfgang Pauli'sc riticism. "If a mathematical proof is what matters in physics, you would be a great physicist.' ( Thirring[2001] , p. 5). Vo nNeumann'schange may have occurred from conversations with Nils Bohr at the 1936 Warsaw NewT heories in Physics Conference (IntCoop[1936] ). In a discussion session von Neumann agrees with Bohr that his Hilbert Space formalization is problematic.
In the area of quantum logic, Michael Stoltzner in his article "Opportunistic AxiomaticsvonN eumann on the Methodology of Mathematical Physics" (Stoltzner[2001] ) argues that von Neumann continued to use axiomatics in his defense of quantum logic into the 1950s disagreeing with my anti-formalism argument in the computing area. However, Stoltzner also argues that von Neumann'so pportunism was sometimes philosophically inconsistent, and Stolzner'sv on Neumann quotations advocating axiomization use examples from quantum mechanics only.
Physicist Opposition to Hilbert'sAxiomization of Science
There is a long and well known history of physicist (originally Max Planck and Albert Einstein) opposition to Hilbert'sa xiomatic physics that von Neumann was familiar with. The dispute started when Planck sent a letter in the early 1890s to Hilbert objecting to Hilbert's axiomization of Kirchhoff'sradiation lawasbeing "unsuitable" (Schirrmacher[2010] , p. 43). The next dispute arose in in 1895 when Planck hired Ernst Zermelo (later a developer of ZF axiom system) as his assistant. Zermelo provedthat reversible physical processes were impossible. The proof is obviously wrong and would not have been popular with a thermodynamics expert such as Planck . 26-27).
Also, Einstein writes in his 1921 lecture on Geometry criticizing axiomatics:
This viewo fa xioms, advocated by modern axiomatics, purges mathematics of all extraneous elements. ... such an expurgated exposition of mathematics makes it also evident that mathematics as such cannot predicate anything about objects of our intuition or real objects (Einstein[1921] ).
Tw o other areas with opposition to formal axiomatics are first Karl Runge who also taught with Hilbert at Gottingen in the late 19th century and who worked with Planck and thought Hilbert'sm ethod of calculating in the continuum was wrong (Schirrmacher[2010] ). Second the BletchleyP ark code breaking calculations from WW II that directly influenced von Neumann's conception of computing. The Colossus machine was much better than the earlier Turing Enigma machine because William Tutte realized the Turing and Hilbert automata approach of obliviously substituting clauses in a giant array was not as good as lowl ev els tatistics and iterations (Tutte[1998] ). Von Neumann was familiar with Cryptographya nd listed it as an important application of computers in a funding proposal to NavalO fficer Lewis Strauss (Neumann[2005] Oct. 24, 1945 to L. Strauss, p. 237).
Von Neumann'sCharacterization of Computation as the MRAM Model

Von Neumann had MovedBeyond Godel'sLogic
The previous historical anti-formalist context influenced von Neumann'sc omputer science from his first interest in computation in the early 1940s until his death in 1957. John von Neumann consistently discussed algorithm efficiencya sn umber of operations executed on a digital computer of the von Neumann type. The type of complexity theory asked about in Godel's 1956 letter to von Neumann and justified by Hartmanis using the letter had already been rejected by von Neumann as shown by his writings and discussions.
Even if von Neumann had been healthy, I believe Godel'sl etter to von Neumann on the problem of "howm anyT uring Machines steps are required to decide if a proof of length n for a formula F in predicate calculus" (Hartmanis[1989] , p. 6) would have fallen on deaf ears because vonN eumann'st hinking had movedb eyond logic models of computation to modern physically realized computers.
Finally,v on Neumann had already expressed some skepticism toward Godel'sl ater work. At least theyw ere not working on common projects. In a letter to Institute of Advanced Study director Oswald Veblen recommending Godel for a permanent appointment, von Neumann wrote:
Godel'sw hole intellectual behavior at present is such, that he may easily do more work in mathematics proper.I nf act, I judged, that his probability of doing some is no worse than that of most mathematicians past 35 (Neumann[2005] 
Von Neumann justification of the MRAM model
In his first draft of his report on EDVA C ,von Neumann organized the the computer system as "a central unit to carry out the four basic arithmetic operations (I am following here, p.39)." Also "a central control unit to control the proper sequencing of operations and make the individual units work together (p. 39)." Finally,"Amemory unit to store both numerical data (...) and numerically coded instructions." Vo nN eumann was interested in presenting a "logical" description of the stored-program computer rather than an engineering description (p.40). The keytounderstanding this description as an MRAM model where data describing other algorithms (programs) can be coded in memory cells whose size determined the size of the problem that could be solved (p. 39) is to understand that von Neumann had been concerned and written on various types of infinity.V on Neumann'sl ogical description of a computing device imagined problem size being determined by machine size.
This 19th century type of infinity imagines finite but unbounded machine size determining solvable problem size. Vo nN eumann assumed his logical machine description would be large enough (unbounded but finite) to solveag iv enp roblem. This type of infinity needs to be contrasted with P=?NP type of algebraic infinity where existence and transformation exist because theycan be generated from the axioms of set theory.
In a 1946 paper with Herman Goldstine, von Neumann argued that some sort of intuition had to be built into programs instead of using brute force searching (Aspray[1990], p. 62) . This needs to be read in contrast to P=?NP where all problem details are removedb yaf ormal automata based method to convert all problems to satisfiability.V on Neumann explicitly rejects automata based complexity in discussing the problem with formal neural networks.
The insight that a formal neuron network can do anything which you can describe in words is a very important insight and simplifies matters enormously at lowc omplication levels. It is by no means certain that it is a simplification on high complication levels. It is perfectly possible that on high complication levels the value of the theorem is in the reverse direction, namely,t hat you can express logics in terms of these efforts and the converse may not be true. (quoted in , note 94, p. 321).
Vo nNeumann argues for using computer programs to analyze properties of Automata in contrast to the P=?NP use of automata to model and explicate computation.
Edward Kohler (Kohler[2000] ), p. 118) describes von Neumann'sd iscovery in developing modern computer architecture in an article "Whyv on Neumann Rejected Carnap'sD uality of Information Concepts" as:
Most readers are tempted to regard the claim as trivial that automata can simulate arbitrarily complex behavior,assuming it is described exactly enough. But in fact, describing behavior exactly in the first place constitutes genuine scientific creativity.I ti sj ust such a prima facie superficial task which von Neumann achievedi nh is [1945] famous explication of the "von Neumann machine" regarded as the standard architecture for most post World-War-II computers.
Deolalikar'sP!=NP Scientific Solution Merits Further Study
Nowt hat it has been established that P equals NP using the scientifically best model of computation hardness, the Deolalikar scientific solution to the NDTM P=?NP problem becomes much more interesting as a mathematical physics problem and needs to be revisited. Deolalikar showed using a model from statistical physics plus various auxiliary conditions on state space connectivity that P is not equal to NP within the NDTM P=?NP research programme (Deolalikar[2010] ). Deolalikar used various theories from disparate areas including statistical physics, state space geometry and properties of Boltzmann gasses to limit the size of the graph from the encoding of satisfiability.I ti sa ne mpirical question if the various assumptions and conditions on the mathematical objects is justified within the NDTM P=?NP research programme.
Unfortunately,t he proof was rejected by the automata theory community,It hink, due to twoo bjections by N. Immerman that appeared on R. Lipton'sb log (Immerman[2010] ). In my viewI mmerman'sc riticism is not correct because his twoc laims of mistakes in Deolalikar's argument are just auxiliary conditions Deolalikar assumes and uses in his scientific solution. The conditions are:
1. Recall that an order on the structure enables the LFP computation (or the Turing machine that runs this computation) to represent tuples in a lexicographical ordering. ... Unfortunately,itisnot true that each stage of the fixed point must be order invariant.
2. Second, Deolalikar assumes the nature of computation is limited to simple types of relations (monadic) that limits the number of graph theory edges constructed from the Turing machine model.
The conditions are certainly plausible. Possibly Deolalikar should claim a solution to the NDTM P=?NP problem with a list of assumptions, or maybe the conditions need empirical testing. Another wayofstating the disagreement is that in Immerman'sviewthe first problem is an incorrect property of the mapping to a TM and the second monadic relation assumption is "physically" incorrect. In Deolalikar'sc onception of computation, the conditions correspond to computational reality.
Conclusion
Iw ould viewt his philosophical paper a success if it leads to theory proliferation and research programme competition in the computation hardness area. There are interesting TM program speed questions in pure mathematics. The mistakeistoassume those problems have any connection to physical reality or empirical questions involving algorithm design. The assumption that a solution to the current NDTM P=?NP problem will change computer science is false. Sometimes expressed as allowing brute force search to be performed rapidly.A nother mistakei sr ejecting proofs of NDTM problems (and other calculation related problems) by excluding or requiring certain assumptions. The rejection of Deolalikar'sa uxiliary conditions is counter productive and incorrect. Ap ossibly interesting problem in pure mathematics following Finsler'sPlatonism is to ask what happens to complexity classes if TMs are assumed to not exist.
There are also interesting empirical questions involving mathematical physics. One can imagine an experiment in microphysics that showed statistical models of gases have a specific interaction property that would cause people to viewc omputation differently.P ure mathematics could still study non real gas graph edge connectivity,b ut it would not be seen as having much interest.
